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Preface 
 
 
 
Establishing a Mediterranean Free Trade Area through Association Agreements is a focal 
point of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. This study draws on existing literature to take 
stock of these Association Agreements, as well as identifying structural features of the 
Mediterranean economies hampering their growth. The study concludes by identifying pol-
icy and research issues in the light of the EU interests in stability and economic growth at 
its Southern border as part of a recently formulated common European security strategy.  
 This study was prepared at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
and Food Quality under program 411 (Socio-economic questions in an (inter)national con-
text). The authors benefited greatly from discussions with the advisory committee of the 
Ministry, consisting of: 
- Gerrit Meester (Chairman); 
- Laura Birkman (International Affairs); 
- Henk Massink (International Affairs); 
- Raymond Tans (International Affairs); 
- Frits Vink (Agriculture); 
- Herman van Wissen (Agricultural Counsel in Egypt); 
- Anne Wolthuis (Industry and Trade). 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
The September 11th attacks generated an increased interest in economic growth as a means 
of reducing the breeding ground for violent religious fundamentalism. In this spirit, the 
guidelines for a new common European security strategy call for a ring of stable countries 
around the EU. At the Southern border stability and economic growth are to be promoted 
through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The EMP consists of two compo-
nents: Association Agreements aimed at establishing a Mediterranean Free Trade area 
(FTA) and MEDA funds to support restructuring of MPC economies. Based on existing 
literature, this study takes stock of the progress made towards a Mediterranean FTA and it 
identifies structural features of Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) hampering eco-
nomic growth. 
 The main focus of the EMP, serving interests of both EU and MPCs, is to promote 
economic growth in the MPCs through a Mediterranean FTA. Whether this aim will be 
reached depends first of all on the amount of liberalisation achieved by the agreements. A 
second factor determining the effectiveness of the EMP is the importance of trade liberali-
sation, relative to other factors limiting economic growth in MPCs. If current levels of 
protection play only a minor role, little can be expected from the EMP in terms of promot-
ing economic growth.  
 There seems ample scope for liberalisation of Mediterranean trade. Currently signifi-
cant protection exists, across the board in the MPCs, while mainly in agriculture at the EU 
side. With this protection in place the EU is already a major destination for MPC exports 
and major origin for MPC imports. Reduction of trade barriers can thus be expected to 
have a significant impact on Mediterranean trade flows. The liberalisation achieved 
through the EMP is, however, limited. Some concessions are made, but the general con-
sensus is that not much can be expected in terms of agricultural concessions from the EU. 
A new feature of the EMP is the reciprocal character of the preferences, requiring a reduc-
tion in the high current protection levels of the MPCs. Sizeable reductions in protection 
will require a major restructuring of their economies, and will not be easy to achieve. This 
concern is also reflected in the availability of EU funds to facilitate restructuring. 
 The still fast growing labour force in the MPCs necessitates an accelerating eco-
nomic growth. The track record of the MPCs is not promising, growth rates have been 
lagging compared to other regions, due an inflow of foreign exchange from oil and remit-
tances, high protection levels and high state interference. State intervention in the 
agricultural sector also has been high, through price interventions, quotas and tariffs. 
 Historically MPCs have had high levels of protection and diverted from the global 
trend towards more open policies. In addition to restrictive trade policies there is still a 
hefty government intervention in the MPC economies. It seems more feasible in the short 
run to reduce the indirect distortions of the economy than reducing trade barriers. Two ma-
jor reasons for the reluctance to reduce trade barriers is the bloated public sector and the 
lack of international competitiveness of MPC producers. Liberalising trade would reduce 
government income and may wipe out a large part of the MPC production, both of which 
 10
may result in massive social unrest. Given past trends and the current economic context in 
the MPCs, the reciprocal trade liberalisation implied by establishing a FTA seems unlikely 
to materialise. 
 Based on the assessment of the EMP, three policy issues are identified: 
- coordinate domestic and foreign policy interests of the EU; 
- design (trade) policies to support structural changes in the MPCs; 
- promote South-South integration among MPCs. 
 
 To support formulation of policies that account for the political and economic reality 
at both the EU and MPC side, the following research issues are identified: 
- analyse the extent and impact of non-trade barriers on trade flows; 
- analyse ways in which liberalisation of trade with EU can contribute to economic 
growth in the MPCs; 
- analyse the regional distribution of costs and benefits between Northern and South-
ern EU member states and the opportunities offered by the recent eastward expansion 
of the EU; 
- analyse the impact of trade liberalisation on migration flows. 
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1. Aim and scope 
 
 
 
After the Barcelona meeting in 1995, the EU and its Mediterranean Partner Countries 
(MPCs) engaged into an ambitious venture of increased economic, political and social co-
operation through Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and financial cooperation. 
Ambitions in terms of economic cooperation were especially high, aiming at a Free Trade 
Area (FTA) by 2010. This should create an area of shared prosperity, fostering peace and 
stability in this turbulent area.  
 The September 11th attacks generated an increased interest in promoting economic 
growth as a means of reducing the breeding ground for violent religious fundamentalism. 
In this spirit, the guidelines for a new common European security strategy calls for the 
promotion of a ring of well-governed countries around the EU, making explicit references 
to the Mediterranean countries (Solana, 2003:8): 
 
'The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean 
partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the 
framework of the Barcelona process.' 
 
 Following September 11th, not only Europe has increased its attention for the Medi-
terranean countries. The United States also intensified its activities in the area, as part of a 
set of Presidential initiatives to promote security interests through development. Given the 
renewed interest in promoting development in the Mediterranean countries, it seems an ap-
propriate time to take stock of the past achievements made by the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP).  
 The aim of this study is to provide a first assessment of the impact of the EMP. First 
the current state of the negotiations, and a short summary of the two components of EMP 
is provided. Based on this discussion three main factors are identified that affect the impact 
of the EMP on economic growth in the MPCs: amount of liberalisation achieved by the 
EMP, factors affecting economic growth in MPCs, and factors affecting trade liberalisation 
by the MPCs. Based on this discussion a first assessment of the EMP is made and key pol-
icy and research issues are identified.  
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2. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
 
 
 
At the Barcelona Conference in 1995 the EU revived its involvement in the Mediterranean 
area by launching the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) with twelve Mediterranean 
Partner Countries (MPCs): Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Mo-
rocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya has recently been invited to 
join the Barcelona process. Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are on a path towards full-fledged 
membership of the EU, and current agreements with the EU move far beyond the agree-
ments with the other MPCs. Since the Association Agreements with the other MPCs do not 
aim at EU membership, the EU-candidate countries are not included in this study.  
 The EMP is divided in two components: Association Agreements aimed at liberalisa-
tion and cooperation in different areas, and financial support provided through MEDA and 
the European Investment Bank. 
 
 
2.1 Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
 
The first part of Table 2.1 summarises the current state of the Euro-Mediterranean Associa-
tion agreements. With all countries association agreements have been signed, except for 
Syria with which negotiations are ongoing. Trade preferences that may be granted are 
bound by rules for WTO members, Table 2.1 therefore indicates WTO membership of the 
MPCs. 
 
 
Table 2.1 EMAAs, WTO, GAFTA and Agadir membership of MPCs 
 EMAA  WTO GAFTA Agadir 
 Signed Effective  Member   
Tunisia 1995 1998  1995 1998 2003 
Israel 1995 2000  1995 -  
Morocco 1996 2000  1995 1998 2003 
Palestinian Territories 1997 1997 a)  - -  
Jordan 1997 2002  2000 1998 2003 
Egypt 2001 2004  1995 1998 2003 
Algeria 2002 - b)  observer 1998  
Lebanon 2002 - c)  observer 1998  
Syria - - d)  - 1998  
a) Agreements with the Palestinian Territories are an interim agreement; b) Ratification of agreement with 
Algeria is pending; c) With Lebanon an Interim agreement is in force since March 2003; d) Negotiations with 
Syria are ongoing since 1997. 
Note: Libya is an observer until UN sanctions are lifted. 
Source: EU Commission (europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/index.htm), European Commis-
sion (European Commission, 2003), WTO (www.wto.org). 
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 Establishment of a FTA implies South-South integration as well. The EMAAs, how-
ever, are bilateral agreements between MPCs and the EU, and thus do not cover South-
South liberalisation. Two possible avenues to such liberalisation are the (revived) GAFTA, 
and the recently negotiated Agadir agreement. Membership of these agreements is indi-
cated in the last two columns of Table 2.1. 
 Although details of agreements differ across MPCs, the EMAAs share a number of 
common themes:  
- political dialogue; 
- respect for human rights and democracy; 
- establishment of WTO-compatible free trade over a transitional period of up to 12 
years; 
- provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public procurement, competition 
rules, state aids and monopolies ('deep integration'); 
- economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors; 
- cooperation relating to social affairs and migration (including re-admission of illegal 
immigrants); 
- cultural cooperation. 
 
 Given this wide coverage, full implementation of the agreements would have a con-
siderable impact on the (economic) relations between the EU and MPCs. 
 With the ambitious goal of creating a Mediterranean FTA by 20101, concessions on 
manufacturing goods provide for a well-defined, progressive tariff dismantling over a time 
span of twelve to sixteen years. Agricultural trade is to be gradually liberalised, on the ba-
sis of traditional trade flows, through periodical revisions of agricultural protocols. The 
process must be consistent with national agricultural policies and results of WTO negotia-
tions. For services, the commitment is to abide by the results of multilateral negotiation 
(GATS). 
 A major difference with agreements from the 1970s is the reciprocity of the EMAAs. 
Earlier agreements, apart from the case of Israel, provided for unilateral concessions by the 
EU. As a result a good share of MPC manufacturing exports already have unrestricted ac-
cess to EU markets through previous co-operation agreements. The industrial trade 
preferences of the EMAAs are thus in practice quasi-unilateral favouring the EU. Recip-
rocity is not restricted to manufacturing, but also applies to agricultural products, entailing 
a new commitment by MPC to introduce preferential measures favouring EU exporters. 
 Establishing a FTA would grant European exporters preferential access to MPC mar-
kets, giving them an edge over other competitors. In practice this advantage seems unlikely 
to materialise. The US is the main competitor of the EU in the Mediterranean region. The 
US has already free trade arrangements with Israel (since 1985), Jordan (since 2000) and 
recently signed one with Morocco. Furthermore, in line with security policies after Sep-
tember 11th, the US has launched a Middle East Trade Initiative in May 2003. This 
initiative mirrors the EMP, aiming at establishment of bilateral trade arrangements and 
                                                     
1 The reference to the deadline of 2010 might be better understood as an expression of political wills that 
should provide a common discipline to the contracting parties. As a matter of fact, trade protocols attached to 
EMAAs provide schedules for tariff cuts that are not consistent with such a time target. Due to the usually 
very long process of negotiation and ratification of the agreements, only the EMAA with Tunisia shows a 
calendar of liberalisation fully compatible with the 2010 deadline. 
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general support for more outward oriented policies in the Middle East and North Africa. 
The overall aim is to establish a US - Middle East Free Trade Area within a decade, i.e. be-
fore 2013. Given the pace at which the US is moving, establishment of a European FTA 
with the MPCs would not give European producers an edge, but would only keep them at 
par with their US competitors.  
 
 
2.2 Financial support through MEDA and the European Investment Bank 
 
The second cornerstone of the EMP is a new modality of managing financial co-operation, 
based on an autonomous financial regime with a single budget for the whole Mediterra-
nean area (MEDA).1 MEDA I replaced previous five-year bilateral protocols, entailed a 
three-times increase in the financial support provided by the EU (4.6 billion euro from in 
1995-99), and a notable enlargement of issues to be tackled. MEDA I has been succeeded 
by MEDA II, making available 5.35 billion euro over the period 2000-2006, while the pro-
gram is incorporated in a larger process of restructuring EU cooperation towards 
development (European Commission, 2001). 
 MEDA is closely linked to the aim of creating a Mediterranean FTA. Funds are dis-
bursed to improve economic and social policy making, as well as for direct budgetary 
support to facilitate structural adjustment programs (European Commission, 2003). A lim-
ited amount of the MEDA interventions are meant to support rural development (technical 
assistance, training, product diversification, environmental and social protection measures). 
 During the time span covered by MEDA I (1995-99) about 86% of the funds have 
been committed to bilateral co-operation regarding structural adjustment (15%), economic 
transition support (30%), socio-economic balance support (29%), environment (7%), a ru-
ral development (5%). Actual MEDA payments, however, have been much lower than 
commitments (only 26%), due both to the length of the implementation period for some 
projects, and due to negotiating controversies as well as cumbersome procedures for pro-
ject approval and management. 
 In addition to the MEDA funds the European Investment bank (EIB) has launched a 
Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facility in October 2002, encompassing all EIB lending to 
the Mediterranean. The fund disbursed by the EIB aim at promoting private sector devel-
opment. The lending portfolio of 9 billion euro has been supplemented by an additional 8 
to 10 billion (up to 2006) when the Facility was launched.  
 To place the financial contributions of the EU in the MPCs into perspective, Table 
2.2 summarises the grants provided by the US during the period of MEDA I. The USAID 
grants are only part of the financial support by the US to MPCs. In addition, to these grants 
there are general loans and specific programs, like food for peace programs or military as-
sistance. 
 
 
                                                     
1 Reg. (EC) n. 1488/96 and Reg. (EC) n. 2698/2000 (MEDA II). 
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Table 2.2 MEDA I funds and USAID grants in the period 1995-1999 
MEDA I  4.6 a) 
USAID grants  11.1 b) 
 
USAID by country (%) Algeria 0 
 Egypt 39 
 Israel 53 
 Jordan 4 
 Lebanon 0 
 Morocco 1 
 Syria 0 
 Tunisia 0 
 West Bank and Gaza 3 
a) Euro billion. 
b) USD billion. 
Source: USAID Green Book (2003), qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html. 
 
 
 The first thing to note is that in terms of general grants the US spends already more 
than twice as much in the region as the EU. The second observation from Table 2.2 is that 
the majority of the money (92 percent) flows to just two countries, Israel and Egypt. This 
distribution reflects the political interests of the US in the region. In this context is also 
worth mentioning that following September 11th the US has closely linked its development 
assistance to security concerns. For the period 2004-2009 the strategic plan for the US 
Agency for international development is a combined document with the US Department of 
State. 
 
 
2.3 Summarising the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
Despite the wide scope of EMAAs, the centre of gravity of the EMP is the establishment of 
a Mediterranean FTA. The implicit assumption seems that increased trade fosters growth 
of the MPC economies. The aims of the EU seem to be both broad and long term (promot-
ing political stability at its Southern border through increased welfare) as well as more 
narrow and short term (unrestricted access for EU manufacturing exports to MPC mar-
kets). The absence of well-defined schedules for abolishing protection on agricultural trade 
also reflects narrow short-term interests of the EU. 
 Short-term interests of the MPCs are first of all the additional funds provided through 
MEDA and the EIB. Full implementation of the agreements implies a major, possibly so-
cially disruptive, restructuring of their economies. This feature of the EMAAs is clearly 
acknowledged by the specific allocation of MEDA funds to facilitate the transition. Since 
the MPCs already have unrestricted access for their manufacturing exports to the EU, their 
short and long term interests seems liberalisation of access to EU markets for their agricul-
tural exports.  
 The main aim of the EMP, serving the interests of both EU and MPCs, is to promote 
economic growth. The main instrument for achieving this is to establish a Mediterranean 
FTA. Whether this aim will be reached depends first of all on the amount of liberalisation 
achieved by the agreements. A second factor determining the effectiveness of the EMP is 
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the importance of trade liberalisation, relative to other factors limiting economic growth in 
MPCs. If current levels of protection play only a minor role, little can be expected from the 
EMP in terms of promoting economic growth.  
 The remainder of this study looks at the three factors affecting the impact of the EMP 
on economic growth in MPCs: amount of liberalisation in the EMP, main factors affecting 
economic growth in MPCs, and the factors affecting liberalisation by the MPCs.  
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3. Liberalisation in the EMP 
 
 
 
Three elements play a role when assessing the achievements of the EMP in liberalising 
trade: current patterns in protection, the current trade flows in the Mediterranean, and the 
amount of liberalisation achieved by the EMP. 
 
 
3.1 A first look at current protection patterns 
 
In order to establish the need and scope for liberalisation, an idea of the current protection 
levels affecting Mediterranean trade is needed. Figure 3.1 summarises the trade restrictive-
ness of MPCs and the EU. 
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Figure 3.1 Trade restrictiveness and mean tariffs 
Note: Restrictiveness index: less than 2 = free trade policy, between 4 and 5 is repressed trade policy. 
Source: Heritage Foundation (Gwartney et al., 2003) World Bank Development Indicators (2002). 
 
 
 With the exception of Israel, all MPCs implement repressing trade policies, which is 
also reflected in high mean tariffs. The MPCs do not seem to follow the global trend of re-
ducing trade protection, making it one of the most protective areas in the world (European 
Commission, 2003). 
 The numbers in Figure 3.1 refer to trade policies in general, obscuring the consider-
able protection of the EU on agricultural products. Agricultural trade policies towards 
MPCs are governed through a complex system of seasonal preferences for 'sensitive prod-
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ucts'1, restoring higher tariffs and entry prices for the majority of fresh fruit and vegetables 
in EU harvesting periods. The MPCs mirror this by protecting 'strategic products'.2 
 In summary, there is ample scope for liberalisation though the EMP. MPCs could 
strive for an across the board trade liberalisation, since their protection levels are well be-
yond global averages. For the EU, there is ample scope for simplifying and reducing 
protection on specific Mediterranean agricultural products. 
 
 
3.2 Current trade flows 
 
The impact of trade liberalisation in the Mediterranean region depends on the levels of 
trade. The EU is much larger than the MPCs combined, both in terms of population and 
sise of the economy. The MPCs are only a minor trading partner for the EU, while the EU 
is a major trading partner for the MPCs (about 50 percent of MPC trade is with the EU). 
The discussion of trade patterns is therefore from the perspective of the MPCs. Since the 
aim of the EMP is to intensify trade relations in the Mediterranean region, the trade data 
are broken down by region.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Export from MPCs (totals and shares by destination) 
 2000-201  Shares (%) 1995  Shares (%) 
 (USD 106)  EU MPC US ROW (USD 106)  EU MPC US ROW 
MPC 77754  48 2 21 29 44116  48 3 18 31 
Algeria 22031  63 1 16 20 9357  65 2 17 16 
Egypt 4165  31 9 8 52 3444  46 11 15 28 
Israel 31407  27 0 37 36 19047  32 0 30 38 
Jordan 1433  4 15 10 71 1432  6 8 1 85 
Lebanon 802  20 12 7 61 642 a)  23 13 6 58 
Morocco 7432  75 1 3 21 4719  62 3 3 32 
Syria 4634  66 6 1 27 n.a.  n.a.an. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tunisia 5850  80 2 1 17 5475  79 5 1 15 
a) For Lebanon data from 1997 were used. 
Source: ITC/WTO data. 
 
 
 The dominant position of exports to the EU is immediately obvious, taking a con-
stant share of 48 percent of exports both in 2000/2001 and in 1995. The (anticipation) of 
the EMP thus does not seem to have led to an increasing share of exports to the EU. Inter-
estingly enough, the constant share of the EU is due to high export levels from Morocco, 
Syria and Tunisia. The relative share of the EU in the exports of the other countries has 
been declining. Trade among MPCs also seems not affected by the EMP, showing a de-
crease from 1995 to 2000/2001 for all countries, except Jordan. Exports to the US, on the 
                                                     
1 According to the Commission, 'sensitive' Mediterranean products are: tomatoes, olive oil, almonds, oranges, 
mandarins, lemons, grapes, melons, strawberries, flowers, potatoes, rice and wine (European Commission, 
1997). 
2 The definition of 'strategic' products varies among MPCs, but the bulk of these product is made of staple 
food (cereals, meat and dairy products). 
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other hand, are stable or increasing for most MPCs. The aggregate data in Table 3.1 show 
that overall exports from the MPCs have increased, while relative shares of trade with the 
EU and among MCPs declined. Part of this is due to an increasing share of trade with the 
US, but most of it is with the rest of the world. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Import from MPCs (totals and shares by destination)  
 2000-201  Shares (%) 1995  Shares (%) 
 (USD 106)  EU MPC US ROW (USD 106)  EU MPC US ROW 
MPC 92765  46 2 13 39 78443  51 2 18 29 
Algeria 9152  57 1 11 31 10782  59 3 17 21 
Egypt 12756  30 1 14 55 11739  39 1 15 45 
Israel 35742  43 0 19 38 28344  52 0 30 18 
Jordan 4442  31 5 10 54 3696  33 5 1 61 
Lebanon 6759  43 7 7 43 7438 a)  37 6 6 51 
Morocco 11533  58 2 6 34 8540  56 3 3 38 
Syria 3815  31 4 7 58 n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tunisia 8566  70 2 5 23 7903  71 4 1 24 
a) For Lebanon data from 1997 were used. 
Source: ITC/WTO data. 
 
 
 Exports only present one side of the trade story, Table 3.2 therefore looks at the pat-
tern in imports. Comparing total imports to total exports reveals a continuing, albeit 
decreasing, trade deficit for all MPCs, except Syria. Comparing shares in imports between 
200/2001 and 1995 shows that imports from all regions have decreased, indicating a diver-
sification in the import pattern of the MPCs to the rest of the world. 
 Based on these aggregated data we can conclude that (anticipation of) the EMP has 
not led to an increased trade flow on in the Mediterranean. Instead, shares of the EU in im-
ports and exports are declining, as is the amount of trade among MPCs. The relative share 
of exports to the US do show an increase. Despite the downward trend, the share of EU in 
imports and exports remains around 50 percent. This implies that liberalisation of trade 
with the EU could have a considerable impact on MPC economies. 
 The data above do not disaggregate trade in agricultural products. This being the area 
were liberalisation by the EU can be expected to have most impact, Table 3.3 and 3.4 pre-
sent disaggregated agricultural trade data for the MPCs as a whole. Fruit and vegetables 
are the main agricultural export commodity from the MPCs (22 percent of total agricultural 
exports), of which 50 percent is destined for the EU. This is also the group of commodities 
for which EU protection is strongest. Cereals are the main agricultural import commodity 
(31 percent of agricultural imports), of which 28 percent is originating in the EU. The US 
are a larger supplier of cereals, accounting for 38 percent of imports. 
 Across all agricultural commodities, both imported and exported, the EU takes the 
largest share. Liberalisation of agricultural trade in both directions thus potentially has a 
large impact on the trade flows in the Mediterranean. Given the trade patterns in Table 3.3 
and Table 3.4 liberalisation of agricultural trade of MPCs with the US would have a strong 
impact on the trade in cereals. How this affects the relative position of the EU depends on 
the amount of liberalisation achieved by the EMP. 
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3.3 Liberalisation achieved through the EMP 
 
As far as establishing a FTA is concerned the absence of a defined perspective of liberali-
sation of agriculture must be stressed (EU, 1995, emphasis added):  
 
'taking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the various agricultural 
policies allow and with due respect to the results achieved within the GATT negotia-
tions, trade in agricultural products will be progressively liberalised through 
reciprocal preferential access among the parties.' 
 
 A rather sceptical interpretation of the Barcelona Declaration is that there will be no 
liberalisation of agriculture, apart from commitments made within the GATT negotiations 
that cannot be withheld from most MPCs by the MFN principle. This interpretation seems 
to fit observed behaviour: there have been no significant new concessions of the EU for ag-
ricultural products in the EMAAs, nor are these expected to come about in the near future 
(Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:402). 
 For the MPCs a preferential treatment of imports from the EU is a brand new feature. 
Compared to EU concessions, MPC preferences are even more limited, both in terms of 
share of preferential over total trade flows and in terms of tariff reductions. Products con-
cerned are largely staple foodstuff or 'continental' products. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Value and destination of agricultural exports by MPCs (2000) 
 Export composition  Destination (% by category) 
 (USD 106) %  EU MPC US Rest of world 
Agricultural products 7872   37 2 16 45 
Vegetables and fruit 1758 22  50 4 5 41 
Cereals, cereal preprtns. 1337 17  8 0 60 32 
Fish, crustaceans, mollusc 1199 15  63 2 2 33 
Cork and wood 481 6  49 0 1 50 
Fixed veg. fats and oils 404 5  48 1 8 44 
Crude animal, veg.materl. 401 5  66 3 10 21 
Animal feed stuff 389 5  10 5 38 47 
Tobacco, tobacco manufact 299 4  18 2 6 75 
Live animals 286 4  3 0 0 96 
Misc.edible products etc 240 3  37 2 5 56 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 228 3  12 6 8 75 
Meat, meat preparations 212 3  19 0 16 65 
Dairy products,bird eggs 196 2  33 1 2 65 
Oil seed, oleaginus fruit 170 2  15 1 31 53 
Sugar, sugr.preptns, honey 167 2  29 2 2 67 
Beverages 63 1  48 1 7 43 
Animal, veg.fats, oils, nes 26 0  9 9 5 77 
Hides, skins, furskins, raw 14 0  58 7 0 36 
Animal oils and fats 3 0  16 0 11 73 
Note: for Egypt data from 2001 were used. 
Source: ITC/WTO data. 
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Table 3.4 Value and origin of agricultural import by MPCs (2000) 
 Export composition  Origin (% by category) 
 (USD 106) %  EU MPC US Rest of world 
Agricultural products 14084   34 2 20 44 
Cereals, cereal preprtns. 4363 31  28 0 38 33 
Cork and wood 1147 8  48 0 2 49 
Vegetables and fruit 1061 8  28 12 10 50 
Dairy products, bird eggs 931 7  66 1 3 31 
Animal feed stuff 858 6  18 3 33 46 
Sugar, sugr.preptns, honey 827 6  59 1 1 40 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 737 5  15 2 2 81 
Fixed veg. fats and oils 714 5  27 5 8 60 
Tobacco, tobacco manufact 649 5  16 1 40 43 
Misc.edible products etc 518 4  61 7 19 12 
Oil seed, oleaginus fruit 497 4  17 0 37 45 
Meat, meat preparations 472 3  15 0 7 78 
Live animals 431 3  40 0 1 59 
Fish, crustaceans, mollusc 387 3  30 7 6 57 
Crude animal,veg.materl. 189 1  56 4 13 26 
Animal, veg.fats, oils,nes 122 1  45 2 12 41 
Beverages 95 1  78 1 5 16 
Animal oils and fats 77 1  4 0 8 88 
Hides, skins, furskins, raw 10 0  25 5 17 53 
Note: for Egypt data from 2001 were used. 
Source: ITC/WTO data. 
 
 
 In contrast to agricultural products, for manufacturing products time-frames for phas-
ing out of protection are part of the EMAAs. Whether these will be followed remains an 
open question, most MPCs are not yet required to cut back protection. Tunisia is ahead of 
the other MPCs in reforming its economy, and was the first MPC to sign an EMAA. Tuni-
sia has implemented a range of major reforms, except for abolishing trade barriers. If the 
liberalisation of manufactured goods was implemented overnight, one-third of the indus-
trial firms would be go bankrupt. An adjustment program therefore has been implemented 
to prepare firms for the increased competition. The success of this program is limited and 
there is an increasing pressure on the government to pushback the deadline of 2008 for full 
liberalisation (Riess et al., 2001). 
 
 
3.4 Summarising the liberalisation achieved by the EMP 
 
Summarising, there seems to be ample scope for liberalisation to impact Mediterranean 
trade flows. Currently significant protection exists, across the board in the MPCs, while 
mainly in agriculture at the EU side. With this protection in place the EU is already a major 
destination for MPC exports and major origin for MPC imports. Reduction of trade barriers 
can thus be expected to have a significant impact on the trade flows. The liberalisation 
achieved through the EMP is, however, limited. Some concessions are made, but the gen-
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eral consensus is that not much can be expected in terms of agricultural concessions from 
the EU. 
 A new feature of the EMP is the reciprocal character of the preferences, requiring a 
reduction in the high current protection levels of the MPCs. Sizeable reductions in protec-
tion will require a major restructuring of their economies, and will not be easy to achieve 
as the example of Tunisia illustrates. This concern is also reflected in the availability of 
MEDA funds to facilitate restructuring. 
 Before turning in more detail to the patterns of protection at the MPC side, we first 
take a closer look at the structural features of the MPC economies. These features affect 
the impact of trade liberalisation on economic growth and the scope for liberalisation at the 
MPC side.  
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4. Mediterranean Partner Country (MPC) economies 
 
 
 
The MPCs economies cover a broad spectrum. Where Israel has relatively high per-capita 
income levels, comparable to EU incomes, the other MPCs included in this study are in 
found in the middle to low-income bracket. Correspondingly, varied models of economic 
development are found: from countries increasingly participating in the world economic 
system, to countries with marked protectionist tendencies. Despite the diversity it is still 
possible to identify certain common elements across the MPCs, especially the ones that can 
be classified as developing countries (DCs): high population growth, lagging economic 
growth, importance of agriculture, and high protection levels. 
 This section discusses the structure of MPC economies in order to assess the extent 
to which liberalisation through the EMP may contribute to economic growth. The first sec-
tion discusses key economic characteristics and their development over time. Section 2 
analyses the multiple causes dragging economic growth in MPCs, assessing to what extent 
the EMP may contribute to economic growth. Section 3 takes a closer look at structure of 
MPC agriculture and agricultural policies pursued by MPCs. 
 
 
4.1 Key economic characteristics 
 
Table 4.1 presents key economic indicators of MPCs. The MPCs are small economies 
compared to the EU. The total GDP of all MPCs together is about the GDP of Spain and 
about 15 percent lower than the total GDP of EU accession countries (European Commis-
sion, 2003). In general the MPC economies can be characterised by high levels of debt, 
relatively high population growth and high inflation rates. 
 High population growth requires high economic growth to maintain employment. 
Lack of employment has repercussions for social stability and the scope for structural 
changes in the economy. Table 4.2 presents demographic characteristics of the MPCs. 
Comparing the population growth over the period 1990-1999 from Table 4.2 to the annual 
population growth in 2000 from Table 4.1 suggests that the population is growth is slowing 
down in most countries. Due to past growth levels, the growth of the labour force is still 
high in most MPCs, while unemployment levels are already high (about one-third of the 
labour force in Algeria and Jordan).  
 From these aggregate data emerges a picture of economies that have not been able to 
grow fast enough to absorb a fast growing labour force. At the same time most countries 
face serious debt problems, reducing the room for economic restructuring. The positive ex-
ception in economic terms is Israel, faring much better than the surrounding countries. The 
next section takes a closer look at the reasons for the lagging economic growth in the ma-
jority of MPCs. 
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Table 4.1 Economic indicators of Mediterranean Partner Countries (2000) 
 GDP level 
 
GDP growth 
1990-2000 
GDP /capita 
 
Debt  
 
Popula-
tion 
growth 
Annual  
inflation 
1990-99 
 (USD  
Billion ) 
(%) (USD 1000) (% of  
exports) 
(%) (%) 
Algeria 48.8 -2.4 1.6 112 1.5 19.0 
Egypt 78.4 6.2 1.2 107 1.9 9.1 
Israel 106.4 7.3 17.1 n.a. 2.1 10.6 
Jordan 7.9 7.0 1.6 130 3.1 3.2 
Lebanon 12.5 16.0 2.9 n.a. 1.3 24.0 
Morocco 39.3 4.3 1.4 124 1.6 3.2 
Syria  13.6 1.0 0.8 290 2.5 8.7 
Tunisia 23.6 6.7 2.5 112 1.1 4.7 
Palestinian 
Territories 4.1 n.a. 1.4 n.a. 4.3 n.a. 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002). 
 
 
Table 4.2 Demographic characteristics of MPCs (1999) 
 Population 
 
Labor force  
Urban  
population Unemployment b) 
 Total Growth a) Density  Total Growth a)    
 (mln) (%) (pop/km2)  (mln) (%)  (%) (%) 
Algeria 30.5 2.2 12  10.6 4.0  59.6 26.4 
Egypt 62.4 1.9 58  26.0 2.9  45.0 11.3 
Israel 6.1 3.0 269  2.7 4.1  91.1 7.7 
Jordan 4.7 4.4 47  1.5 5.2  73.6 30.0 
Lebanon 4.3 1.8 391  1.1 3.1  89.3  
Morocco 28.2 1.8 59  11.5 2.7  55.3 17.8 
Syria 15.7 2.8 77  5.1 4.0  54.0  
Tunisia 9.5 1.6 58  3.8 2.8  64.8 16.0 
 Palestinian 
Territories 2.8 n.a. n.a. 
 
n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
a) Annual growth 1990-1999; b) average percentage labour force (1994-1997). 
Source: World Bank and FAO data. 
 
 
4.2 Causes of lagging economic growth 
 
A combination of relatively high population growth and extensive unemployment make 
economic growth a prime issue for MPCs. However, the actual track record of the MPCs is 
rather disappointing, lagging behind the growth rates obtained by comparable countries in 
other parts of the world. Figure 4.1 sketches different, interconnected causes of the lagging 
economic growth in the MPCs, generalising over the different countries. Three main forces 
dragging economic growth are depicted in the first row of text blocks: non-trade income, 
high protection and extensive state interference in the economy.  
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 A first factor dragging economic growth is the presence of non-trade income. Oil ex-
ports and remittances are important sources of foreign exchange for a number of countries. 
Such an inflow of foreign exchange distorts the economy ('Dutch Disease') by boosting 
domestic demand. The resulting appreciation of the exchange rate promotes investments in 
non-traded sectors of the economy, while reducing investments in the traded sector. Such a 
distorting role of oil-income is relevant in Egypt, Algeria and Syria (Riess et al., 2001), 
while the ratio of remittances to value of exports approaches one in Egypt and Jordan, un-
derscoring the role of (temporary) migration in MPC economies (Nassar and Ghoneim, 
2002).  
 A second factor dragging economic growth is high protection due to an inward-
looking development strategy. The high protection shelters domestic firms from interna-
tional competition. This reduces incentives for efficiency improvements an investments in 
innovations. Combined with the focus on non-traded sectors induced by inflows of non-
trade foreign exchange, this resulted in a production structure that is not internationally 
competitive. 
 
High protection
Limited domestic 
competition and innovation
Unprofitable, slow growing state 
enterprises that depend on subsidies 
and soft bank loans
Extensive state 
interference in economy
Non-trade income 
(oil, remittances)
Production not 
internationally 
competitive
Macro-economic 
instability (high 
inflation, fiscal deficits)
Investment in 
non-traded sectors
Slow economic growth
 
 
Figure 4.1 Outline of causes of slow economic growth in MPCs 
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 A third factor dragging economic growth is the extended influence of the state on the 
economy. This government influence takes the shape of an over-staffed public sector and a 
dominant presence of state enterprises. The bloated character of public sector employment 
is apparent from the fact that its share in (non-military) employment is twice the global av-
erage, accounting for close to one-fifth of employment in MPCs. At the production side the 
state also plays a significant role, for example accounting for 30 percent of GDP in Egypt 
and Tunisia, and close to 60 percent in Algeria. Public investments were close to 40 per-
cent of total investment, which is double the middle-income country average. Booming oil 
revenues in the 1970s and 1980s provided a further stimulus to increasing public sector ex-
penditures in oil exporting countries (Bulmer, 2000; Riess et al., 2001).  
 High protection and extensive government involvement in the economy has led to 
unprofitable state enterprises that are maintained with subsidies and soft loans. This poses 
a high pressure on state budgets, causing severe macro economic instability. This macro-
economic instability makes reforms about as necessary as difficult. Tariff revenues com-
pose an important part of the government budgets. Countries with high import ratios from 
the EU will be faced with significant losses in income if they grant the EU preferential ac-
cess to their markets, necessitating a restructuring of their economy. 
 
 
4.3 Structure of agriculture and MPC agricultural policies 
 
Although agriculture is an important sector across the board, its role in the overall econ-
omy differs by MPC (see Table 4.3). The classification of most MPCs as developing 
country is reflected for most countries by the high share of the labour force employed in 
agriculture (between 12 and 36 percent of the total labour force). In high income countries 
this proportion is less than 10%, as reflected by the low percentage for Israel.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Contribution of agriculture to GDP and employment in MPCs 
  Composition GDP (%)  Agricultural labour force  
(% total labour force) 
  Agriculture Industry Services  1990 1999 
Algeria  9 60 31  26 24 
Egypt  17 34 49  40 33 
Israel  3 30 67  4 3 
Jordan  3 25 73  15 12 
Lebanon  12 22 66  7 4 
Morocco  14 32 54  45 36 
Syria   24 30 46  32 28 
Tunisia  12 29 59  29 25 
Palestinian 
Territories 
 
8 27 66 
 
n.a. n.a. 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002) and FAOSTAT. GDP data are for 2000. Excep-
tion is GDP by sector for Israel (2001 estimates from CIA world factbook (CIA, 2002)). 
 
 
 In terms of GDP, agriculture is a major sector, again mostly for developing MPCs, 
contributing as much as 24% to GDP in Syria. Jordan seems to have a more particular eco-
nomic structure, although agriculture contributes significantly to employment (supplying 
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12 percent of employment), its contribution in terms of share of GDP is limited to 3 per-
cent. 
 Production composition varies considerably from country to country, but is centres 
around cereals and fruit and vegetables, followed by other staple foodstuff, or typically 
Mediterranean products (meat, milk, potatoes, sugar, pulses, nuts, olives and olive oil). The 
importance of agricultural raw materials, such as tobacco, cotton and sugar beet is more 
limited. Egypt is a main producer, especially for staple foodstuff; though other countries - 
the Maghreb1, Israel and Syria - are often important players for particular markets.  
 Besides the fundamental climatic and geographic features of the Mediterranean area, 
the composition of production is affected by long-term trends in world prices and the rela-
tively lower level of protection of some target markets for Mediterranean products (fruit 
and vegetables, olive oil). Products not strictly Mediterranean (cereals, meat and milk) 
maintain an important role in the agricultural system, by providing subsistence to peasant 
farmers and in some cases, because of policy support and trade protection aimed at reduc-
ing dependence on imported food (INEA, 2002; DeRosa, 1997). 
 The main issues in MPC agriculture can be summarised under three headings: polar-
ised production structure, production limitations, and food security. There is a marked and 
growing polarisation between large-scale capitalist companies farming, and small family 
holdings. Institutional factors, insufficient public intervention in the reform of land owner-
ship and, for some MPCs, strong government support for agricultural exports have 
accentuated this dualism. Large firms complain above all about the lack of adequate ser-
vices, while small farmers find it difficult to make a living from traditional farming 
practices. This is due to natural and technical restraints, obstacles to mechanisation and 
other structural limitations, but also to price dynamics and conditions of marketing chan-
nels (INEA, 2002). 
 Environmental, climatic and technological limitations impose restrictions on the ex-
pansion of arable land, and create problems for the sustainability of traditional agricultural 
methods and ecosystems. The lack of fertile land and water is an evident limitation to agri-
cultural development, while the goal of increasing yields creates further problems, due to 
chemical inputs already being used on a massive scale. Desertification, soil erosion and in-
fertility are serious problems brought about by overgrazing, intensive crop rotation and the 
abandonment of traditional agricultural practices. Inefficient and insufficient consideration 
of soil characteristics are often a feature of the management of water resources and can 
lead to the soil becoming too saline or alkaline, as happens in Syria and Egypt, or to soil 
erosion, widely spread in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and the Maghreb (Makhlouf et al. 1998; 
Lacirignola-Hamdy, 1995). 
 Orientations and tools of agricultural policy differ from country to country2. In the 
case of Israel, agricultural policy has been influenced since its foundation by the need to 
combine agricultural development with national security and self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction, given its hostile geopolitical environment. As regards the other MPCs, agricultural 
policy decisions have been mainly oriented towards dealing with structural problems and 
related issues. In this context, the major priorities of agricultural policy are to improve the 
performance of the sector and the level of food security. Minor objectives - but by no 
                                                     
1 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia. 
2 Remainder of this section is based on INEA (2002). 
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means negligible - relate to improving linkages between vertical stages of agro-food sys-
tems (competitiveness, marketing, etc.), as well as environmental protection, food quality 
and food safety. 
 Measures of producer support and market regulation evolve slowly within the con-
text defined by adjustment programs, WTO commitments, and preferential deals with the 
EU. All imply, for Mediterranean DCs, a fundamental change in price policies, with the 
aim of restoring the market mechanism and improving its operation. Liberalisation and 
structural adjustment have important implications for agriculture. Agricultural policy re-
form aims to open domestic markets, reducing protection differentials among agriculture 
and other sectors, but also to reduce government support for production prices (and/or re-
ducing consumer subsidies), and reducing input subsidies. 
 Some countries have made considerable strides in this direction. Egypt above all, as 
well as the Maghreb countries, have modified their policies considerably in order to reduce 
protection in the industrial sector and re-launch agriculture by improving market effi-
ciency. The most important measures are the following: 
- reform at the level of infrastructure, especially all for the collection and transfer of 
water resources, in particular in the Maghreb;  
- promotion of privatisation, private investment and a more dynamic land market (the 
Maghreb, Egypt and Jordan), though within strict budget limitations of stabilisation 
and adjustment programs; 
- significant interventions in agricultural development services and marketing co-
ordination (the Maghreb). 
 
 The effects of the reforms vary depending on the starting point of the country con-
cerned and the level of social consensus, but the overall picture is still characterised by 
hefty government regulations of agricultural markets, through intervention on prices (con-
sumer and producer subsidies), quantities (quotas) and tariffs. In fact, the reform process 
has been rather selective: government support and trade protection are still considered in-
dispensable for certain products, while forms of policy intervention, aimed either at 
controlling food prices or extracting surplus from the agricultural sector, are still in place. 
Moreover, there are still cases where agriculture suffers from overvaluation of real ex-
change rates and trade protection in the manufacturing sector. 
 
 
4.4 EMAAs and migration 
 
Since remittances are an important feature of MPCs, one can wonder about the impact of 
the EMAAs on migration from MPCs to the EU. This question is largely absent from exist-
ing studies of the EMAAs, although reducing the flow of migrants from countries like 
Morocco is an important policy issue for the EU. The EMAAs could reduce migration if 
they would stimulate intensive-intensive production in the MPCs, thus increasing wages 
and reducing the incentives for migration. This is a standard argument, assuming that trade 
and migration are substitutes.  
 Preliminary analyses of the impact of NAFTA on migration flows between Mexico 
and the US, however, suggests that establishment of a FTA can increase migration flows. 
Different theoretical explanations can be provided for such an outcome. One is a rise in 
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wages following the FTA, allowing low-skilled labourers to accumulate the cash needed 
for migration. In this line of thought trade and migration are complements, not substitutes. 
New trade theory, allowing for a concentration of economic activity, provides an alterna-
tive explanation. Reducing trade barriers allows industries to become more concentrated. 
Given the hub-and-spoke structure of the EMAAs this concentration is likely to occur in 
the EU, suggesting an increase in migration as well.  
 
 
4.5 Summarising the main features of MPC economies 
 
The still fast growing intensive force in the MPCs necessitates accelerating economic 
growth. The track record of the MPCs is not promising, growth rates have been lagging 
compared to other regions, due an inflow of foreign exchange from oil and remittances, 
high protection levels and high state interference. State intervention in the agricultural sec-
tor also has been high, through price interventions, quotas and tariffs. The next section 
takes a closer look at the different forms of protection in the MPCs. 
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5. Scope for liberalisation by the MPCs 
 
 
 
A key element of the EMP is the reciprocal nature of the trade liberalisation, contrasting 
with asymmetric liberalisation by the EU of earlier agreements. The scope for liberalisa-
tion by the MPCs depends on the current level of protection and political possibilities for 
liberalisation.  
 Most studies of the EMP focus on the (lack of) liberalisation at the EU side. In terms 
of the impact on the MPCs, lagging liberalisation of agricultural trade by the EU is most 
important since barriers to manufactured exports to the EU have been lifted in the 1970s. 
The position of the EU with respect to the liberalisation of agricultural trade is well docu-
mented and there are no reasons to expect major changes in this position. Protection by the 
EU will thus not be further discussed here. 
 This section takes a closer look at trade barriers erected by the MPCs. Although pro-
tection is only one out of multiple causes dragging economic growth in the MPCs, it is the 
aspect most easily influenced through the EMP. Furthermore, an essential feature of the 
trade liberalisation in the context of the EMP is the reciprocal nature, requiring the MPCs 
to remove their trade barriers as well. This feature of the EMP also warrants a closer look 
at the protection in the MPCs. 
 First, trade protection by MPCs is compared to other regions and its development 
over time is assessed. Second, non-trade polices affecting production and trade patterns are 
discussed. The third part addresses some to of the reasons for the high trade protection and 
other interventions in the MPCs.  
 
 
5.1 Comparing trade protection in the MPCs to other regions in the world 
 
Detailed studies of protection at the MPC side are few and far between. Srinivasan (2002) 
provides a rare summary of different studies, of which the main points are summarised 
here. Table 5.1 reproduces protection indicators for a selected number of MPCs for which 
data are available in the TRAINS database. Table 5.2 reproduces the scores of the MPCs 
on three aggregated protection measures. 
 All indicators confirm the earlier made observation of high protection rates in MPCs. 
The weighted average tariff rate provides an illustration of the protection rates. Egypt has 
the lowest score of the MPCs with a weighted tariff of 13.7 percent. This is still high than 
the highest score by income group (12.6 percent for low income countries). This result re-
flects the lack of trade liberalisation while the rest of the world has been reducing trade 
barriers. The MPCs started from historically high protection rates and have not been reduc-
ing (and sometimes even increasing) these rates.  
 Of the MPCs, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have gone furthest in reforming their 
economies. This reform, however, has not extended to trade protection. This is illustrated 
by the weighed tariff of Tunisia being more than double the tariff of the low-income coun-
tries.  
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 In terms of aggregate protection measures the MPCs score even worse. The aggre-
gate measures build on the simple average tariff rate and the standard deviation, both of 
which are exceptionally high in the MPCs. In terms of the Andrew and Neary measure of 
trade protection only South Asia comes near the protection levels in the MPCs. Within the 
group of MPCs included in Table 5.1 and 5.2 Jordan has the lowest level of protection, due 
to extensive reforms in the 1990s. 
 The EMP could be expected to lead towards a more open orientation of the MPC 
economies. Table 5.3 shows the development over time of the trade retrictiveness indica-
tor. In 2003 all MPCs, except Israel, can be classified as having a restrictive trade policy. 
More interesting is the development over time. One could have expected a more outward 
looking trade policy developing over time. According to Table 5.3 only Egypt and Syria 
seem to fit this pattern, moving to a more open trade policy in 2003. The patterns of the 
other countries, however suggest that this may only be a temporary change. Jordan, for ex-
ample, increased its protection in 2003. Morocco and especially Lebanon alternate between 
open and restrictive trade policies. Overall, there is no indication that the MPCs are follow-
ing the global trend towards more open policies. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Trade protection indicators for selected MENA countries 
 Simple 
average 
Weighted 
average 
Standard 
deviation 
NTB  
coverage 
Escalation 
index 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) Ratio 
Selected MPCs      
Algeria 24.2 17.3 16.7 15.8 1.6 
Egypt 28.1 13.7 130.6 28.8 2.1 
Jordan 21.6 18.9 15.8 0.0 1.1 
Morocco 35.7 25.8 31.2 5.5 1.1 
Tunisia 29.9 28.8 12.8 32.8 1.1 
Comparators by income group      
Low income countries 15.5 12.6 10.9 5.5 1.5 
Lower middle income countries 15.3 12.5 15.0 13.4 1.7 
Upper middle income countries 13.8 11.6 12.3 14.7 1.6 
High income countries 4.3 3.4 7.0 15.6 1.7 
Comparators by region      
Europe and Central Asia 9.8 6.7 11.0 10.9 2.0 
East Asia 13.1 8.7 16.8 9.9 1.8 
Latin America 13.1 11.9 8.5 17.1 1.6 
Sub-Sharan Africa 17.7 14.2 13.3 4.5 1.5 
South Asia 19.7 18.8 11.7 8.2 1.2 
Note: MFN tariff rates are used; NTB coverage refers to the percentage of tariff lines having at least one 
NTB; the escalation index is the ratio of the simple average tariff on final goods to the tariff on intermediate 
goods. 
Source: Table 1 in Srinivasan (2002:9) based on TRAINS database. 
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Table 5.2 Aggregated trade protection indicators for selected MENA countries 
 Sharer Oliva Anderson & Neary 
Selected MPCs    
Algeria 7.0 20.0 25.0 
Egypt 8.0 55.8 23.5 
Jordan 4.0 14.4 n.a. 
Morocco 7.0 26.6 35.0 
Tunisia 8.0 26.1 23.8 
Comparators by income group    
Low income countries 3.5 11.7 21.2 
Lower middle income countries 4.1 14.7 15.1 
Upper middle income countries 4.1 13.6 11.8 
High income countries 3.1 8.0 10.9 
Comparators by region    
Europe and Central Asia 3.5 10.4 11.6 
East Asia 3.9 13.2 11.3 
Latin America 3.6 12.9 14.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 13.1 18.9 
South Asia 4.2 14.6 27.7 
Note: The Sharer index is an arbitrary scoring system combining MFN tariff rates and standard deviations; 
the Oliva index combines tariff rates, standard deviations and NTB coverage; the Anderson and Neary index 
is the uniform tariff rate applied to a free trade regime to return welfare to the most recent year of observa-
tion.  
Source: Table 1 in Srinivasan (2002:9) based on TRAINS database. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Trade restrictiveness over time by country 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Algeria 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 
Egypt 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Israel 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Jordan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Lebanon n.a. 2 2 5 2 5 3 4 5 
Morocco 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 
Syria n.a. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Tunisia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Note: Restrictiveness index: less than 2 = free trade policy, between 4 and 5 is repressed trade policy. 
Source: Heritage Foundation (Gwartney et al., 2003). 
 
 
5.2 Government interventions in agriculture 
 
Apart from a restrictive trade policies consisting of tariffs, licensing, import bans, state 
trade monopolies, multiple exchange rates and restrictive foreign exchange allocation, 
other MPC policies may affect domestic production and the scope for foreign competitors 
(ERF, 2002).  
 Agriculture is important for MPCs, in terms of employment, contribution to GDP 
and income distribution effects (poverty tends to be concentrated in the rural regions). His-
torically the MPC governments intervened in the agricultural sector through purchases of 
commodities (cereals, vegetable oil, sugar), output support for both farmers and agro-food 
processors, subsidising inputs (water, fertilizers, seed, machinery), and consumer subsi-
 33
dies. The amount of intervention varied with the commodities, from direct control of prices 
and markets for strategic commodities (like wheat and sugarbeet), to competitive markets 
for fruits and vegetables. The policy interventions require huge outlays of public finds and 
were hard to maintain when economic circumstances took a change for the worse. Some 
countries reformed their agricultural interventions in the course of implementing structural 
adjustment programs (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), others (notably Syria) main-
tained the prime role of the state (Chaherli, 2002). 
 Despite reforms distorting policies remain. At the production side these mainly affect 
'strategic products': wheat in most MPCs, milk and olive oil in Tunisia; cotton, sugar beet 
and tobacco in Syria; sugar beet and tobacco in Lebanon (Chaherli, 2002). At the input 
side a wide array of subsidies is used to stimulate cereal and livestock production. Subsi-
dies of feed area a common feature, representing the most important (and constant) item of 
the agricultural budget in MPCs. Analyses of the competitiveness of MPC production indi-
cate that in the absence of government interventions in output and input prices, MPC 
producers could not compete with foreign imports.  
 High tariffs to ward off cereal imports and to promote domestic production leads to 
high domestic prices. Most MPC governments subsidised consumer prices to reduce the 
burden for consumers. Intervening at both sides of the market poses a heavy burden on 
government budgets. Most countries have therefore reduced food subsidies, generally in a 
gradual fashion to avoid political instability.  
 Apart from tariffs and quotas there seem to be other restrictions to trade since quota 
fill rates are (well) below 100 percent. It seems likely that the administration of the quotas 
is hampering foreign imports. In the case of Egypt, for example, product standards are ap-
plied to imports do not apply not domestic, like requiring imported beef to have less than 7 
percent fat content while no restrictions apply to domestic beef (USTR, 2003). 
 
 
5.3 Factors affecting the slow pace of reform in MPCs 
 
The comparison with protection in other regions begs the question why the MPCs are not 
following the global trend towards freeing trade. The implication of diverging from the 
global pattern is that the MPCs will be loosing in terms of international competitiveness 
relative to other regions in the world. There thus seems to be a clear case for at least keep-
ing protection levels in line with the rest of the world.  
 Analysis of the relative strength of import substitution industries and export-oriented 
industries for Morocco and Egypt, suggests a strong lobby for maintaining protection rates 
(Srinivasan, 2002). This leaves the question why there is such a strong import substitution 
industry. Trade policies unfavourable to export and generally unsupportive domestic poli-
cies seem to play a role in the development of import substitution industries requiring 
continuous protection. 
 Policies oriented towards import substitution were made possible by the inflow of 
foreign exchange (from natural resources and remittances) and by preferential agreements 
the MPCs engaged in. Income from fuel and remittances allowed the financing of an ex-
pansive public sector and of the interventions at the producer and consumer sides. At the 
same time a number of MPCs enjoyed preferential access to EU markets for textiles and 
clothing. Resulting investments in this sector may have been at the expense of investments 
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in medium technology industries (like industrial chemicals, standardised machinery, sim-
ple electrical and electronic products). Latin American countries (with similar 
endowments) did make these investments, gaining market share. Given the learning-by-
doing which plays an important role in manufacturing, the inward looking strategy of the 
MPCs could prove to be costly in the future.  
 
 
5.4 Summarising the scope for liberalisation by MPCs 
 
Historically MPCs have had high levels of protection and diverted from the global trend 
towards more open policies. In addition to restrictive trade policies there is still a hefty 
government intervention in the MPC economies. Taking Tunisia as representative for the 
MPCs, it seems more feasible in the short run to reduce the indirect distortions of the 
economy than reducing trade barriers; Tunisia made major strides towards economic re-
form, except for liberalising trade. Two major reasons for the reluctance to reduce trade 
barriers is the bloated public sector and the lack of international competitiveness of MPC 
producers. Liberalising trade would reduce government income and may wipe out a large 
part of the MPC production, both of which may result in massive social unrest. Given past 
trends and the current economic context in the MPCs, the reciprocal trade liberalisation 
implied by establishing a FTA seems hard to achieve. 
 The impact of preferential access for textile and clothing on industrial developments 
raises a question on the impact of preferential access granted by the EU for specific agri-
cultural products granted. Similar to the distortion in manufacturing, these preferences may 
have distorted the agricultural production structure of the MPCs.  
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6. Key policy and research issues 
 
 
 
In summary the current implementation of the EMP can be summarised as a mainly trade-
focussed agreement in which no significant results are obtained in reduction agricultural 
trade protection, neither at the EU nor at the MPC side. Although reducing protection on 
manufacturing by the MPCs is specified by time schedules, past trends give no reason to 
expect theses schedules to be met. The increasing trade with the US suggests that their 
trade agreements and financial support are more effective than the European initiative.  
 In the light of the discussion of the EMP the following policy issues can be identi-
fied: 
- Coordinate domestic and foreign policy interests. Foreign and domestic EU policies 
towards the MPC are currently non-coherent. Explicitly considering conflicting ob-
jectives would foster the consistency of EU policies, and would support development 
of alternative policies more in line with the multiple objectives of the EU.  
- Design policies to support structural changes in the MPCs. Liberalising trade reduces 
high protection levels in the MPCs, but also has strong implications for government 
tariff revenues and social stability. Explicitly accounting for the structural features of 
the MPC economies could facilitate the design of agreements such that they promote 
growth and support a gradual move towards more open economies, while acknowl-
edging the constraints faced by the MPC governments.  
- Promote south-south integration. To achieve the aim of a prosperous and secure 
Mediterranean region South-South integration should become an integral part of the 
EMP.  
 
 To support formulation of policies that account for the political and economic reality 
at both the EU and MPC side, the following research issues can be identified: 
- The extent and impact of non-trade barriers. The increasing importance of NTBs for 
trade in food (like vertical integration of production, grade and quality standards) 
implies on the one hand that the impact of agricultural trade liberalisation could be 
limited. On the other hand, they provide an opportunity for designing policies that 
promote integration of MPC agriculture in European chains, possibly promoting ag-
ricultural growth within the limits of the current protection structure.  
- Contribution of liberalisation with EU to economic growth in the MPCs. Taking 
promotion of economic growth in the MPCs as the aim of the EMP, limited insight is 
currently available on how the EMP interacts with MPC policies and structural fea-
tures of MPC economies. Most existing studies focus on the (lack of) liberalisation 
the EU side, while limited insight is available on the structure of protection at the 
MPC side, their trade agreements with third parties (notably the US), and the impact 
of their policies on economic growth and poverty reduction. Furthermore, the differ-
ent pace at agreements concluded with the MPCs may affect the distribution of costs 
and benefits when establishing a Mediterranean FTA. 
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- Regional impact of liberalisation in the EU and possible links with eastward expan-
sion. Liberalisation of trade with the MPCs will have a negligible impact the EU has 
a whole. The main opposition against the liberalisation stems from Southern EU pro-
ducers who will face increased competition. At the moment there is no insight in 
which regions will be negatively affected by a liberalisation of agricultural trade with 
MPCs. Furthermore, the eastward expansion of the EU possibly offers new markets 
for the Southern EU producers, which could offset the negative impact liberalisation 
with the MPCs. Such a linking of South and Eastward expansion could make estab-
lishment of a Mediterranean free trade more feasible politically.  
- Impact of EMAA on migration. The EMAAs could reduce migration by narrowing  
the gap between wages in the EU and MPCs. Preliminary analyses of the NAFTA, 
however, suggest that an increase in migration is more likely. A FTA can increase 
migration by increasing the opportunities for accumulating the capital needed for mi-
gration, or by promoting the concentration of activities in the EU. Existing studies do 
not address the impact on migration, leaving the impact of the EMAAs on migration 
an open question.  
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